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HISTORY, TEXT, TRADITION, AND THE
FUTURE OF SECOND AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE: LIMITS ON ARMED
TRAVEL UNDER ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW, 1688–1868
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I
INTRODUCTION
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court directed lower courts to
consider history as one source for evaluating the constitutionality of gun
regulations.1 History is likely to assume even greater prominence in Second
Amendment jurisprudence with the appointments of Justices Neil Gorsuch and
Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court.2 Heller’s framework requires making
difficult determinations regarding the accuracy of competing narratives about the
American legal past. In the decade since Heller was decided, federal courts have
been presented with two opposing versions of this history.3 One theory, a
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1. See generally 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (using an originalist framework that included a superficial
survey of the history of the Second Amendment).
2. For Justice Kavanaugh’s view, see Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“In my view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are
to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as
strict or intermediate scrutiny.”). For Justice Gorsuch’s view, see Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995,
1998 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting positively
that a Ninth Circuit panel decision “pointed to a wealth of cases and secondary sources from England,
the founding era, the antebellum period, and Reconstruction . . .”). On the likely increasing relevance of
history given the recent Court appointees, see Joseph S. Hartunian, Gun Safety in the Age of Kavanaugh,
117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 104, 116 (2019), and N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 140
S. Ct. 1525, 1540–41 (2020 (Alito, J. dissenting) (per curiam) (arguing that the fact that the City “point[ed]
to no evidence of laws in force around the time of adoption of the Second Amendment that prevented
gun owners from practicing outside city limits” was “sufficient to show that the New York City ordinance
[was] unconstitutional”). Chief Justice John Roberts also gestured toward a historical approach in the
Heller oral argument: “[W]e are talking about lineal descendants of the arms but presumably there are
lineal descendants of the restrictions as well.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(No. 07-290).
3. See generally Mark Anthony Frassetto, Judging History: How Judicial Discretion in Applying
Originalist Methodology Affects the Outcome of Post-Heller Second Amendment Cases, 21 WM. & MARY
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libertarian model, has been advanced by modern gun-rights advocates.4 An
opposing interpretation grounded in a common law-based view of history has
been propounded by legal historians working across a multiplicity of different
sub-fields.5 Gun-rights advocates and their allies among libertarian academics
have argued that a right to peaceful public carry was well-established under
English law and became the dominant paradigm under American law.6
The libertarian account misinterprets English common law, ignoring the
concept of “the peace.” Riding armed was a violation of the peace. Apart from
protection for members of the gentry elite and a limited number of wellrecognized exceptions related to preserving the peace, there was no freestanding
right to travel armed under English law. Indeed, such a right would have been
legally inconceivable given the fact that the monarchy held a monopoly on
violence and any decision to arm oneself was by its very nature a rebuke to the
authority of the Crown. Although the libertarian tradition does have deep roots
in American history, its origin does not reach back to England but rather to the
Slave South. Libertarians have read English and American law through the lens
of antebellum Southern case law, essentially taking legal norms developed in
parts of the Slave South and using them as reflections of broader trends in AngloAmerican law. This approach not only seriously distorts the past, but it
unwittingly fashions modern Second Amendment law on a model derived from
one of the most brutal legal systems in the modern world.7
Given the serious analytical and historical flaws in the libertarian model, it is
not surprising that as more empirical work has appeared on the scope of arms
regulation under Anglo-American law, the extreme gun-rights reading of Heller

BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2020) (summarizing and analyzing the radically different views of the past that
federal courts have used in making sense of the history of firearms regulation after Heller).
4. For a prominent example of the libertarian reading of the history of the Second Amendment
and firearms regulation, see generally FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION,
RIGHTS, AND POLICY (Nicholas J. Johnson et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter FIREARMS LAW].
5. See generally A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?: THE CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT (Jennifer Tucker et al. eds., 2019)
[hereinafter A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?] (reflecting the most recent historical scholarship and
establishing the paradigm for this history). For another sampling of new historical scholarship on guns in
American history that reflects the major trends in post-Heller research and casts doubt on the libertarian
model, see the essays in Engaging America’s Gun Culture, THE PANORAMA: EXPANSIVE VIEWS FROM
THE JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, http://thepanorama.shear.org/tag/engaging-americas-gunculture/ [https:// perma.cc/2YMK-EFTM]. For an analysis of recent case law in this area that
acknowledges the importance of the new regionalist paradigm in scholarship and explores its significance
for the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence, see Young v. Hawaii: Ninth Circuit Panel Holds
Open-Carry Law Infringes Core Right to Bear Arms in Public, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2066, 2070–71 (2019).
6. See, e.g., JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT (1994); David B. Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 127 (2016); Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009) (arguing that the Statute of Northampton only forbade the carrying of arms
when it was “unusual and therefore terrifying”).
7. See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearms Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern
Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J.F. 121, 128 (2015).
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has collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions.8 One of libertarians’
central claims—the existence of a right to peaceable firearms carry under English
common law—turns out to be a modern invention of gun-rights advocates, and is
of fairly recent vintage.9 Apart from a well-defined list of exceptions connected
to the obligation of subjects to help maintain the King’s Peace, there was no
freestanding right to travel armed under Anglo-American law.10 The other
irrefutable fact that has emerged from this new body of post-Heller scholarship
is that Anglo-American tradition was not static, but rather evolved in response
to the rapidly changing circumstances of life in the early American republic.11
Moreover, once this older legal framework was transplanted to America, it
fragmented, producing different regulatory regimes that reflected the diversity of
early American law. After American Independence, these processes of change
intensified, leading to the emergence of radically different approaches to firearms
regulation in parts of the Slave South and elsewhere in the new nation. Although
the common law evolved differently in each of the new states, virtually all
reputable legal historians acknowledge that clear regional patterns also
emerged.12 In particular, virtually all scholars acknowledge the centrality of
Southern slavery to this legal evolution. Rather than speaking with a single voice
on firearms, American law spoke with different and distinctive regional accents.
By the Civil War era, there were at least three different firearms regulatory
regimes in America regarding public carry: (1) a permissive open-carry regime in
parts of the Slave South; (2) a limited militia-based view restricting open carry in
8. See generally the essays in A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?, supra note 5, for examples of recent
empirical work on the scope of arms regulation in early colonial American history. On gun rights, see
generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014). On the anachronistic nature of
libertarian approaches to rights in the Founding era, see generally Jud Campbell, Republicanism and
Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85 (2017). For a persuasive argument that Heller
can be read as accommodating well-accepted principles of American constitutional law, see JOSEPH
BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION,
AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 100–17 (2018).
9. See Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take Two: How
We Got Here and Why it Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 392–94 (2016) (demonstrating that this
libertarian interpretation was invented and propounded by activists with close connections to the
firearms industry and then widely cited in law review articles); Saul Cornell, “Half Cocked”: The
Persistence of Anachronism and Presentism in the Academic Debate Over the Second Amendment, 106 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 203 (2016).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See Brian DeLay, A Misfire on the Second Amendment, 47 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 319, 322 (2019)
(reviewing ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, LOADED: A DISARMING HISTORY OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT (2018), and commenting that “[t]his newer scholarship is more interested in the broad
historical context, more willing to integrate social and cultural history with the familiar legal and political
sources, more attentive to the range of views white Americans expressed about guns in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, and more sensitive to change over time”).
12. See generally, e.g., ELLEN HOLMES PEARSON, REMAKING CUSTOM: LAW AND IDENTITY IN
THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2011) (arguing that the American colonists adapted English
common law to their local conditions); Lauren Benton & Kathryn Walker, Law for the Empire: The
Common Law in Colonial America and the Problem of Legal Diversity, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937
(2014); James W. Ely, Jr. & David J. Bodenhamer, Regionalism and American Legal History: The
Southern Experience, 39 VAND. L. REV. 539 (1986).
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other parts of the South; (3) and a novel “good cause” model of open carry that
originated in Massachusetts but quickly spread to other parts of the nation. By
the end of the nineteenth century, the Massachusetts good cause model had
become the dominant paradigm. This model expanded gun rights far beyond
traditional English law, but did so in a manner consistent with American law’s
veneration for the idea of well-regulated liberty. It provided a flexible approach
to deal with the problems posed by the proliferation of cheap, reliable, and easily
concealed handguns. Balancing liberty and order, particularly in an era where
modern policing and the administrative state were not yet formed, posed unique
challenges for regulating firearms in a nation where gun ownership was far more
widespread than in England.13 Understanding this complex history is therefore
essential to applying Heller’s historical framework.14
At the time Heller was decided, there was relatively little scholarship on the
history of firearms regulation.15 Given this fact, it is not surprising that the Heller
majority focused primarily on a string of antebellum Southern cases grappling
with the implications of the first modern-style weapons-control laws.16 Firearms
had been regulated in America since the colonial era, but as recent post-Heller
scholarship has forcefully demonstrated, America did not have an interpersonal
gun violence problem until the early nineteenth century, when the market
revolution, rising democratization, and the growing individualism of the new
nation’s culture created America’s first gun violence crisis.17 Southern states took
the lead in passing the first regulations aimed primarily at limiting access to
weapons that had little value in promoting the goal of supporting a well-regulated
militia.18 Southern courts divided over how to reconcile these new gun-control
laws with the right to bear arms enshrined in their state constitutions.19 Some
Southern judges adopted a militia-based interpretation of these gun control laws.
This theory afforded full constitutional protection to a narrow subset of weapons

13. There is a vast literature on the rise of the American administrative state. For a useful overview,
see Jed H. Shugerman, The Legitimacy of Administrative Law, 50 TULSA L. REV. 301 (2015). On patterns
of gun ownership in England and America, see generally Kevin M. Sweeney, Firearms Ownership and
Militias in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century England and America, in A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?,
supra note 5, at 54.
14. On the diversity of early American regulatory models for firearms, see generally Joseph
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013); Ruben & Cornell, supra note 7 (arguing that the
Massachusetts Model gained traction in other parts of the country); Young v. Hawaii: Ninth Circuit Panel
Holds Open-Carry Law Infringes Core Right to Bear Arms in Public, supra note 5.
15. For an overview of the existing scholarship prior to Heller, see SAUL CORNELL & NATHAN
KOZUSKANICH, THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
V. HELLER 7–20 (2013).
16. See District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 586 n.9 (2008).
17. See generally RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 15, 300, 352 (2009).
18. For examples of Southern-style concealed-carry laws, see An Act Against Carrying Concealed
Weapons, and Going Armed in Public Places in an Unnecessary Manner, 1813 La. Acts 172; 1856 Ark.
Laws 381–82.
19. For a discussion of the relationship between changes in gun culture and gun regulation, see
generally SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006).
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necessary for a well-regulated militia. All other weapons were treated as ordinary
property subject to the police power of the states. The Heller Court rejected the
militia-based interpretation, thereby elevating the more individualistic view of
gun rights advanced by other Southern courts. This new robust understanding of
the scope of the right to bear arms was rooted in a distinctive form of Southern
gun-rights exceptionalism and was not representative of broader patterns of law
in early America.20
Heller’s heavy reliance on a single strain of antebellum Southern
jurisprudence prompted new scholarly interest in discovering what was going on
in other regions of the nation. As is often the case in historical writing, the
existence of silences and gaps in the historical record spurs new innovative
scholarship.21 In the case of the history of gun regulation, this impetus to dig
deeper into the record of firearms law resulted in the discovery of a previously
hidden body of evidence. Excavating this buried history was facilitated by the
development of more powerful digital tools that made it possible to unearth a
large body of historical evidence largely invisible to the Supreme Court at the
time Heller was decided.22
These sources included a host of statutory restrictions and a body of inherited
common law constraints on armed travel. This new trove of material responded
to Heller’s call for further historical research and was radically different from the
first generation of Second Amendment scholarship. Instead of framing a research
agenda based on the ideological categories of the modern gun debate—whether
the Second Amendment is an individual or collective right—the new empirical
turn in Second Amendment scholarship followed Heller’s injunction to explore
the history of gun regulation in detail.23 This second generation of scholarship
starts with the assumption that the holders of the right were individuals, not
states, and the focus has shifted to the scope of the protected right.24 The new
empirical paradigm that has emerged since Heller has vindicated the suggestion
made by then Judge Brett Kavanaugh in a dissent filed while serving on the D.C.
Circuit about the potential scope of firearms regulation permissible under a
20. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 586 n.9 (citing to the more libertarian line of Southern cases); see generally
Ruben & Cornell, supra note 7.
21. For a classic mediation on historical method, see generally E. H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY?
(1961). For a more recent study, see generally ALLAN MEGILL ET AL., HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE,
HISTORICAL ERROR: A CONTEMPORARY GUIDE TO PRACTICE (2007).
22. See, e.g., Eric M. Ruben & Darrell A. H. Miller, Preface: The Second Generation of Second
Amendment Law & Policy, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017, at 1, 5–9.
23. See id. at 1 (“That first generation [of Second Amendment scholarship] focused on a single
question: Does the Second Amendment protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense, or a collective right connected to the maintenance of a well-regulated militia?”). For a good
example of the limits of first-generation scholarship, see the premature synthesis offered by Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995), which proclaims the
debate over before it had actually begun. In fact, Reynolds’s account was neither critical nor a particularly
comprehensive guide. On the continuing persistence of anachronism and presentism in Second
Amendment scholarship and its failure to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly debate and legal
historical inquiry, see generally Cornell, supra note 9.
24. See Ruben & Miller, supra note 22, at 4–6.
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“history, text, and tradition” approach.25 Kavanaugh argued that a jurisprudence
drawing on Heller’s “text, history, and tradition” analytical framework might
offer evidence for a more robust approach to firearms regulation, not less.26 Nor
should this intuition be all that surprising: a variety of gun regulations have
coexisted with the Second Amendment right and various state constitutional
analogs for more than two centuries. Rather than embody an anti-government
libertarianism, the dominant view of the Founding generation was steeped in a
social contractarian theory and venerated ideas of well-regulated liberty.
According to this view, liberty was always balanced against the necessity of
preserving the peace and promoting the public good.27
Gun regulation in the decades after the adoption of the Second Amendment
did not wither away, but rather intensified.28 The new empiricism in post-Heller
Second Amendment scholarship has revealed the prismatic nature of early
American firearms law.29 Indeed, this fact serves as further vindication of the
genius of the Founding generation’s commitment to federalism. By allowing the
individual states to continue to exercise their robust police powers, the new
federal system was able to accommodate the growing nation’s diverse approaches
to firearms regulation.30 During the vigorous public debate over ratification, the
importance of federalism and state police power was recognized by both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists. Indeed, this core belief was one of the few
points that there was broad agreement on in an otherwise fierce and divisive
debate. Although the arch-Federalist Tench Coxe and the ardent Anti-Federalist
author Brutus opposed one another on virtually every major issue discussed
during ratification, both authors believed that individual states would continue
to regulate matters of internal police, including criminal laws.31 Thus, Brutus
declared that “it ought to be left to the state governments to provide for the
protection and defence [sic] of the citizen against the hand of private violence,
and the wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each other . . . .”32 Federalist
Tench Coxe did not dispute this point, but underscored it when he wrote: “The

25. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
26. See id. (“Indeed, governments appear to have more flexibility and power to impose gun
regulations under a test based on text, history, and tradition than they would under strict scrutiny.”).
27. See generally Campbell, supra note 8.
28. See generally Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487 (2004).
29. See generally, e.g., Ruben & Miller, supra note 22.
30. On the centrality of federalism to the Founding era’s conception of rights, see generally
GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION, AND
THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S (2019).
31. Compare Brutus, Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 358, 400–05 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981), with Tench Coxe, A Freeman, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in FRIENDS
OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 1787–1788, at 88 (Colleen A.
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998).
32. Brutus, supra note 31, at 401.
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states will regulate and administer the criminal law, exclusively of Congress.”33
Under their views, the individual states’ police power would not be diminished
under the new Constitution: rather, states would continue to legislate on all
matters “such as unlicensed public houses, nuisances, and many other things of
the like nature.”34 The efforts of modern gun-rights libertarians to impose a vision
of liberty rooted in Southern slavery’s legal system is thus antithetical to one of
the central compromises that made the Constitution possible: the recognition
that the new federal government would not usurp the individual state’s police
powers.35 Indeed, the antebellum judges Scalia lauded in Heller were balancing
the scope of state police power against the liberty interest of gun owners in light
of changes in both firearms technology and the growing level of violence in
American culture. Whatever one thinks about the jurisprudential foundation for
Scalia’s belief that there was an expiration date on legislative authority to engage
in balancing exercises in this area, Heller clearly sanctions forms of interest
balancing as long as those decisions are historically grounded in early American
law or practice.
One of the most important contributions to the new empirical model of the
Second Amendment is the examination of the previously neglected role of the
common law.36 No principle was more central to this legal framework than the
concept of the peace. Balancing the right to enjoy the peace against the liberty
interest of gun owners is not a modern invention, it is itself part of the original
conception of the right to bear arms and was widely embraced by judges, lawyers,
legislators, and many Americans in the Founding era.37
The primary enforcers and conservators of the peace in both England and early
America were local justices of the peace. These individuals, typically prominent
and respected men in the local community, had broad and far-reaching powers that
included the ability to preemptively disarm anyone who posed a potential threat to
the peace.38 The concept of the peace has been all but lost in modern American
legal thought. Liberty in modern law has been framed in largely negative terms,
as a check on government power. In modern rights theory, obligations are
typically owed to rights holders, but in the Founding era, rights holders
themselves had legal obligations connected to the exercise of rights.39 English
33. Coxe, supra note 31, at 95–96.
34. Id.
35. See LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 30, at 36.
36. See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551
(2006).
37. See Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty
and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017, at 11, 14.
38. See Dietrich Oberwittler, Crime and Authority in Eighteenth Century England: Law
Enforcement on the Local Level, 15 HIST. SOC. RES./HISTORISCHE SOZIALFORSCHUNG 3, 9 (1990) (“In
order to learn something about everyday crime and law enforcement, it is the work of the justices of the
peace (or magistrates, as they were synonymously called) to which one must turn.”).
39. For a trenchant critique of the libertarian vision of rights at the Founding, see Campbell, supra
note 8. There is a huge philosophical literature on modern legal rights. For a good summary of the
sprawling debates over rights, see Kenneth Campbell, Legal Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
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subjects and American citizens had a legal responsibility to assist in preserving
and maintaining the peace. The examples of armed travel cited by modern
libertarians invariably turn out to be part of a set of well-recognized exceptions
to the general ban on armed travel designed to preserve the peace.40 Ironically,
interpreting the Second Amendment without reference to the peace enacts a
perverse form of living constitutionalism, one clothed in an originalist veneer, but
one deeply at odds with the text, history, and tradition of the right to keep and
bear arms. Protecting this right and paying no heed to its implications for the
peace would have been incomprehensible to Founding-era Americans, and
therefore it makes no sense today. Thus, fidelity to the original Second
Amendment means protecting the peace as much as it means protecting a right
to bear arms.41
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the common law concept of
the peace and shows that armed travel was not a fundamental right in England
before the Founding. Part III traces the evolution of common law notions of the
peace during the Founding and early Republic, showing how regional diversity
in firearms legislation eventually gave way to a consensus based on the
Massachusetts good cause model by the end of the nineteenth century. Part IV
concludes by affirming the need to recognize the diversity of early American legal
culture and the importance of understanding the dynamic nature of historical
change in this formative period of American constitutional development. To be
faithful to Heller’s turn to history, future Second Amendment jurisprudence will
need to approach that history with greater sophistication.
II
THE KING’S PEACE, THE STATUTE OF NORTHAMPTON, AND ENGLISH LIMITS
ON THE RIGHT TO CARRY ARMS
Prior to Heller, there was relatively little interest among English scholars on
how gun rights featured in the broader history of the common law. This neglect
allowed a number of misconceptions to gain currency among a group of
libertarian activists and their allies in academia. Indeed, as the distinguished
English historian Tim Harris noted: “The Glorious Revolution has been
extensively studied and debated ever since it occurred, yet until the work of Joyce
Lee Malcolm, no historian had ever sought to argue that one of its most
significant accomplishments was to establish a new right for Protestants to bear
ARCHIVE (Nov. 4, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/legal-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/L88D-5KJK].
40. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
41. For good introductions to the originalism debate, see generally, for example, Mitchell N.
Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013); Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 722–24 (2011); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 373 (2013). On originalism and the necessity of historical translation, see generally
Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
935 (2015).
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arms.”42 Malcolm posited that arms possession and carrying was a fundamental
right that Americans inherited from England—this claim was foundational for a
theory that came to be known as the “Standard Model” thesis. It would be
difficult to overstate the influence of her thesis on the emergence of a modern
libertarian interpretation of the Second Amendment.43 Despite the fact that most
English historians reject Malcolm’s revisionist account of the English past,44
Malcolm has studiously avoided engaging with the many substantive critiques of
her work and has instead simply repeated her earlier discredited claims or cited
the work of other gun-rights advocates as scholarly authority. In short, outside of
a narrow group of libertarian scholars and gun-rights activists, support for
Malcolm’s thesis has collapsed.45
Under English law, the monarchy and the English state enjoyed a monopoly
on violence so that any subject arming themselves—outside of a clear list of
exceptions—was an encroachment on royal power and hence a violation of
English law. Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries captured this feature of
English law: “[A]ll offenses are either against the King’s Peace or his crown and
dignity.”46 Therefore, it followed that any “affront to that power, and breaches of
those rights, are immediate offenses against [the King.]”47
A key piece of legislation to enforce the King’s Peace was the Statute of
Northampton, which prohibited appearing armed before representatives of the
King’s authority and expressly banned traveling armed at “Fairs, Markets, or
elsewhere . . . .”48 Thus, the basic legal framework of English law created by the
42. Tim Harris, The Right to Bear Arms in English and Irish Historical Context, in A RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS?, supra note 5, at 23. For works challenging Malcolm’s claims about gun ownership and
usage in England, see generally, for example, LOIS SCHWOERER, GUN CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 169–70 (2016); Priya Satia, Who Had Guns in Eighteenth Century Britain?, in A RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS?, supra note 5, at 37.
43. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the
Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1727 (2012) at 1795 (describing how “Standard Model writers fell into line as they imported
Malcolm’s research and conclusions into their own writings”). For Malcolm’s influence on the Standard
Model, see MALCOLM, supra note 6; Reynolds, supra note 23.
44. See generally Harris, supra note 42.
45. For example, in her contribution to this symposium, Malcolm cites the National Rifle
Association’s lawyer Stephen Halbrook as a reliable scholarly authority, despite the fact that his work
has been repeatedly discredited. Compare Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right to Carry Your Gun Outside: A
Snapshot History, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 3, 2020, at 195, with Harris, supra note 42, at 24–27
(detailing how Halbrook’s interpretation of the Statute of Northampton and early modern English law
rests on a perfect storm of historical errors). Further, Malcolm’s view is not consistent with core principles
of English criminal law and English constitutional theory. See Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, What
Is Criminal Law About?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (2016).
46. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258, 338.
47. Id. For an elaboration of the common law framework described by Blackstone, see 1 WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 135–36 (London, Eliz. Nutt 1716).
48. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). Over the ensuing decades, Parliament
reenacted the statute’s prohibition on carrying weapons in public at least twice. See, e.g., 20 Rich. 2, c. 1
(1396) (Eng.); 7 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1383) (Eng.). On the importance of the Statute of Northampton to
maintaining the peace, see generally J. Musson, Sub-Keepers and Constables: The Role of Local Officials
in Keeping the Peace in Fourteenth-Century England, 117 ENG. HIST. REV. 1 (2002).
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Statute of Northampton clearly excluded firearms from both sensitive places such
as courts, and crowded public spaces such as fairs and markets. It is also
important to note that the law recognized the common law crime of affray as a
separate violation of the King’s Peace. The crime of affray was defined in relation
to the peace. Riding armed terrorized the King’s subjects and therefore violated
the peace. The terror at the core of the crime of affray did not require any
intentional act, or menacing behavior, to run afoul of the law; the mere act of
arming itself was sufficient to trigger criminal prosecution because such actions
were themselves a rebuke to the King’s majesty and a usurpation of the
sovereign’s monopoly on violence.49
There were a small number of well-recognized exemptions to the general ban
on armed travel embodied in the Statute of Northampton, which were
acknowledged by virtually every popular legal writer and learned legal treatise
published in England.50 These exceptions aimed to facilitate community-based
forms of law enforcement that preserved the King’s Peace. Accordingly, one
might arm oneself to put down riots, rebellions, or join the “hue and cry.”51 The
text of the statute makes clear that the prohibition was general. Traveling armed
was limited to cases where such action was necessary to preserve the King’s
Peace.52 Strange as this concept might be to modern Americans, it makes perfect
historical sense if one understands the way community-based law enforcement
functioned in early modern England.53 The common law developed to meet the
needs of a preindustrial agrarian society. At common law, if one had a reasonable
fear of attack, the law required one to seek out a justice of the peace and bind the
threatening individual with a peace bond.54 Every gloss on the Statute of
Northampton published in English legal commentaries between the Glorious
Revolution (1688) and American Independence (1776) underscored that this was
the primary mechanism for enforcing the peace.55 William Hawkins’s Pleas to the
49. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49; J.P. GENT, A NEW GUIDE FOR
CONSTABLES, HEAD-BOROUGHS, TYTHINGMEN, CHURCHWARDENS 13–14 (London, Richard &
Edward Atkins 1709); CHARLES JAMES, A NEW AND ENLARGED MILITARY DICTIONARY (London, T.
Egerton 1802).
50. For a good example, see WILLIAM HAWKINS, A SUMMARY OF THE CROWN-LAW BY WAY OF
ABRIDGMENT OF SERJEANT HAWKINS’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 155–63 (London, E. & R. Nutt 1728).
For a systematic survey of this literature, see generally Cornell, supra note 37.
51. See, e.g., SIR JOHN COMYNS, 4 A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 467 (London, A. Strahan
1822). Traditionally, the arms used to meet this public responsibility were determined by social position
so that during much of this period ownership of firearms was limited to members of the gentry. See
generally SCHWOERER, supra note 42, at 162–63; Satia, supra note 42, at 48 n.3. The principle was
established by the Statute of Winchester. See Henry Summerson, The Enforcement of the Statute of
Winchester, 1285–1327, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 232 (1992).
52. Cornell, supra note 37.
53. For a discussion of the evolution of Anglo-American law and ideas of self-defense, see Darrell
A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017, at
85 (showing how Anglo-American law’s evolving understanding of self-defense was tied to changes in
conceptions of government and sovereignty). On community-based policing, see generally STEVE
HINDLE, THE STATE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND, 1550–1640 (2002).
54. See HINDLE, supra note 53, at 97–113.
55. See Cornell, supra note 37, at 24.
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Crown offers one of the clearest explanations of how this idea functioned under
English law. “A Man cannot excuse the wearing [of] such Armour in Publick,”
he wrote, “by alledging [sic] that such a one threatened him, and that he wears it
for the Safety of his Person from his Assault.”56 The appropriate response was to
have the person posing a threat disarmed and placed under a peace bond. This
imposition of a financial burden on offenders was intended to deter future
infractions,57 and was available to any person in the community who felt
threatened by the individual.58 The common law also entrusted broad powers to
enforce the peace to justices of the peace and constables. Any justice of the peace
or constable had the power to detain, disarm, or imprison individuals traveling
armed and then have the offender bound over to the peace.59 Thus, peace bonds
were used by members of the community and officers of the crown to enforce the
peace. Taken together, these broad powers of enforcing the peace were the
foundation for community-based law enforcement in an era before the rise of
modern police forces. Violation of the terms of the bond not only resulted in
forfeiture of the bond, but could trigger the imposition of a more onerous bond
and could also result in further criminal sanctions, including imprisonment.60
Under English law, individuals did not have a right to respond with deadly
force when attacked, but rather were obligated to retreat to the wall before
resisting violence with deadly force.61 English common law also differentiated
between attacks in populous areas where individuals could seek help, and other
areas where an individual was beyond the King’s Peace and could therefore
legally resort to deadly force.62 Accordingly, the claim that there was a
fundamental right to carry arms in public in early modern England makes no legal
sense given the assumptions at the core of English constitutional theory and
criminal law.
Another error in libertarian interpretations of English law stems from reading
modern mens rea requirements into a period of English criminal law where the
requisite criminal intent defining the illegal behavior was inferred from the
prohibited act, not discerned by an inquiry into the subjective state of the mind
56. HAWKINS, supra note 50, at 135–36.
57. Joel B. Samaha, The Recognizance in Elizabethan Law Enforcement, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
189, 198–201 (1981).
58. Id.
59. HINDLE, supra note 53, at 99–100 (describing the way sureties of the peace and good behavior
were used to both punish and preempt anti-social behavior). Hindle notes that traveling armed was one
of the categories of anti-social behavior that this system was designed to prevent. See id.
60. See MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE: CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 264 (London, William Rawlins & Samuel Roycroft
1690) (“[I]f he hath broken (or forfeited) his Recognizance by breach of the Peace, the Justice of Peace
may and ought to bind him anew, and by better Sureties, for the safety of the person in danger . . . .”).
61. On the duty to retreat, see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184–85; EDWARD
COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH
TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 55–56 (London, A. Crooke
1669).
62. See GILES JACOB, THE LAWS OF APPEALS AND MURDER 47 (1719) (differentiating between
“Highway” and “Town” for the purposes of self-defense).
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of the person charged with a violation of the law.63 Although Malcolm and other
libertarian gun-rights advocates cite Michael Dalton’s influential legal guide—
The Country Justice—which was particularly popular in the American colonies,
they ignore the clear textual evidence he presents that contradicts their claims
about a freestanding right to travel armed.64 Dalton summarized the limits on
armed travel under English law in unambiguous terms: those who “go or ride
armed offensively, or with an unusual Manner of Servants or Attendants” were
per se “accounted to be an affray, and fear of the People and a means of the
breach of the peace . . . .”65 As Dalton’s text made clear, the act of traveling with
an offensive weapon by its very nature provoked a “fear of the people”—there
was no need to establish a specific intent to terrify or prove that an action was an
actual breach of the peace to meet this terror requirement. The legal logic of this
conclusion was clearly explained by Joseph Keble, author of another popular
legal guide at that time:
Yet may an Affray be, without word or blow given; as if a man shall shew himself
furnished with Armour or Weapon which is not usually worn, it will strike a fear upon
others that be not armed as he is; and therefore both the Statutes of Northampton made
against wearing Armour, do speak of it.66

Dalton and Keble recognized that arming outside of a narrow list of legally
sanctioned exceptions established an asymmetry of power, which produced the
terror to the people that disturbed the peace.
Another fact about English law that seems odd to many modern lawyers and
judges is rooted in the relationship between class and arms in England. Among
the privileges enjoyed by members of the English gentry was the ability to travel
armed without violating the Statute of Northampton.67 Members of the elite did
not violate the King’s Peace when they traveled armed because their actions did
not produce a “terror to the people.”68 The fact that English elites could travel
armed without fear of provoking a terror did not mean that others without wealth
or high social status could claim the same exemption based on their individual

63. Compare the historical account in GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 140–41 (2016), with the
erroneous claims made by Halbrook described in Harris, supra note 42.
64. Joyce Lee Malcolm’s treatment of Dalton ignores the limits on armed travel in his influential
guide for justices of the peace. See Malcolm, supra note 45, at 197.
65. DALTON, supra note 60, at 263–64.
66. JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, FOR THE EASIER
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 147 (London, W. Rawlins 1683).
67. See RICHARD BURN, 1 THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 13 (London, Henry
Lintot, 2d ed. 1756) (“And it is holden upon these words, that no wearing of arms is within the meaning
of this statute, unless it be accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify the people; from
whence it seems clearly to follow, that persons of quality are in no danger of offending against this statute,
by wearing common weapons, or having their usual number of attendants with them, for their ornament
or defence, in such places, and upon such occasions, in which it is the common fashion to make use of
them, without causing the least suspicion of an intention to commit any act of violence, or disturbance of
the peace.”).
68. The notion that there was a general freestanding right to armed travel for ordinary Britons, as
Malcolm alleged, is a modern invention that is not rooted in historical reality. See generally Harris, supra
note 42, at 23; Satia, supra note 42.

BOOK PROOF - CORNELL (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2020]

8/4/2020 11:28 PM

HISTORY, TEXT, AND TRADITION

85

circumstances. The exemption was a categorical privilege of class and rank, not a
contextual judgment made by officers of the crown on a case-by-case basis.69
Understanding the way class shaped English law regarding firearms is
essential to interpreting the most important legal case on the meaning of the
Statute of Northampton, Sir John Knight’s Case.70 For libertarians, Sir John
Knight’s Case demonstrates that peaceable carry was well-established by the
Glorious Revolution era.71 English historian Tim Harris offers a more accurate
account of the case, one that contradicts the anachronistic interpretation
proffered by libertarian scholars:
[A]s the presiding judge at Knight’s trial, Lord Chief Justice Herbert, observed, the
statute had almost gone into desuetude, and there was “now . . . a general Connivance
to Gentlemen to ride armed for their Security.” Herbert felt it necessary to show that
Knight had acted malo animo (with evil intent) for his alleged offense to come within
the terms of the act, though significantly, he insisted that the things of which Knight
stood accused were already offenses at common law.72

As Harris notes, the Lord Chief Justice’s comments about desuetude described
the legal situation of members of the gentry elite and was not a general claim
about English law. The Chief Justice also noted that the prosecution should have
charged Knight for a crime at common law, which would have been a better legal
strategy to bring him to justice. The Chief Justice could hardly have made this
claim if he thought Knight’s behavior was perfectly legal. It is true that Knight’s
jury refused to convict him, but this act of jury nullification was not a reflection
of widely recognized English legal principles.73 Instead, it reflected the bitter
political and religious conflicts England experienced in the years immediately
before the Glorious Revolution.74 Knight had stoked anti-Catholic feeling in the
city of Bristol, and the local jury, sharing his prejudices and political sympathies,
refused to convict him.75 Conspiracy theories involving Catholic plots were rife in
this period of English history.76 Yet, despite being acquitted by a sympathetic jury
69. Prominent libertarian legal scholar Eugene Volokh erroneously argues that this class-based
privilege became a constitutional right in America. See FIREARMS LAW, supra note 4, at 101; Volokh,
supra note 6, at 100–01. This false claim was invented by modern gun-rights advocates and is not
supported by the history, but it continues to be recycled by libertarians and their allies in law reviews.
See Charles, supra note 9, at 393.
70. (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (KB) (Eng.).
71. See, e.g., David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational
Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 203, 223 (2018) (“[T]he Statute of
Northampton was widely ignored, and it was interpreted to apply only to carrying in male animo—not to
carrying for lawful defense.”); Malcolm, supra note 45, at 199–200. This tendentious and flawed reading
of Sir John Knight’s Case has crept into several recent federal court opinions. See, e.g., Kanter v. Barr,
919 F.3d 437, 457–58 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th
Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d
650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Moore
v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 933, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2012).
72. Harris, supra note 42, at 25 (emphasis added).
73. See id. at 27.
74. See generally id.
75. See id. at 27.
76. See id. at 30–32.
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who shared Knight’s political and religious leanings, the Chief Justice bound
Knight over with a peace bond, the only punishment available under law given
the jury’s decision.77
Furthermore, the Chief Justice averred that Knight’s actions were a per se
violation of the King’s Peace because they implied that “the King [was] not able
or willing to protect his subjects.”78 Sir John Knight’s Case does not support the
notion that a robust right to carry arms existed under English law; rather, it
contradicts this claim.
The 1780 London Gordon riots offer another example of how the libertarian
view misinterprets the evidence, reading it in light of libertarian ideals at odds
with the history. To support her theory about the English right to travel armed,
for example, Malcolm quotes this observation by the Recorder of London, the
city’s chief lawyer:
It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of the kingdom, not only a right,
but a duty; for all the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be
ready at all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution of
the law and the preservation of the public peace.79

However, when properly contextualized, this evidence does not demonstrate a
broad right to have arms in public: it demonstrates the opposite. What Malcolm
fails to mention is that this observation regarded the standard exception to the
rule on armed travel that required subjects to assist crown agents in putting down
riots and maintaining the peace. This obligation did not confer a freestanding
right to carry arms. Subjects were expected to turn out with whatever weapons
they were legally entitled to possess to further this goal. The Gordon Riots
example is the exception to the rule, not the rule.
Finally, the libertarian view reads developments from later English law in the
nineteenth century into earlier periods of English history. For example, the key
text for Malcolm is the nineteenth-century English case, Rex v. George Dewhurst
and Others.80 Although the case affirmed that “[a] man has a clear right to protect
himself when he is going singly or in a small party upon the road where he is
traveling or going for the ordinary purposes of business,”81 this view reflected a
dramatically changed understanding of English law and gun culture in the period
after the French Revolution.82 In response to the rising levels of social unrest and
the growing threat posed by Napoleonic France, England abandoned its older
gun culture and embraced a new pro-gun legal ideology.83 Rather than aiming to

77. See id. at 27.
78. (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (KB) (Eng.).
79. Malcolm mistakenly interprets this quote from WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS
ON POLICE: WITH AN ESSAY ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIMES AND AMENDING CRIMINALS
59–60 (London, Baker & Galabin 1785) as asserting a broad individual right to have arms for personal
protection. Malcolm, supra note 45, at 205.
80. See id. at 205–06.
81. Rex v. Dewhurst, 1 State Trials, N.S. 529, 601–02 (1820) (Eng.).
82. See Satia, supra note 42, at 44.
83. Id.
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limit access to firearms to avoid arming the mob, English policy embraced the
necessity of a well-armed citizenry as a means of staving off popular radicalism
and the threat of foreign invasion.84 Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger
stated unequivocally in 1803 that English firearms law had adapted to the realities
of a more dangerous world by adopting a new attitude toward gun ownership.
“[T]here was a time,” he wrote, “when it would have been dangerous to entrust
arms with a great portion of the people of this country.”85 Yet, confronted by new
threats at home and abroad, Pitt concluded “that time is now past.”86 In the
century and a half after the Glorious Revolution, English gun culture and law
was radically and irrevocably transformed. Ignoring these changes and reading
backwards later developments into an earlier period is a profound historical
error.87
III
THE AMERICAN ABSORPTION OF THE COMMON LAW
There were strong continuities between earlier English law and colonial
American law on the issue of public carry. James Davis, author of an influential
American justice of the peace manual published shortly before the American
Revolution, reiterated the continuing importance of the Statute of Northampton
in the colonies. His account of the limits on armed travel echoed earlier English
writers:
Justices of the Peace, upon their own View, or upon Complaint, may apprehend any
Person who shall go or ride armed with unusual and offensive weapons, in an Affray, or
among any great Concourse of the People, or who shall appear, so armed, before the
King’s Justices sitting in Court.88

As had been true under English law, armed travel in populous areas was
prohibited. 89
The most important consequence of the American Revolution was the
transformation of the King’s Peace into a new republicanized legal idea: the

84. Id.
85. 3 THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER; OR HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND COMMONS 774–75 (London, Oriental Press 1804).
86. Id.
87. On chronological fallacies in historical interpretation, see DAVID HACKETT FISCHER,
HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 160–63 (1970).
88. JAMES DAVIS, T HE O FFICE AND A UTHORITY OF A J USTICE OF THE P EACE 13
(Newbern, James Davis 1774).
89. Neither the text of the Statute of Northampton nor subsequent legal commentary support the
idea that guns were only prohibited in sensitive places. Cf. Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 71, at 292
(mistakenly asserting that the Statute of Northampton’s prohibitions on armed travel in public
analogized to Heller’s limits on arms in sensitive places). Fairs and markets were the quintessential public
spaces in early modern England, almost the exact opposite of “sensitive places.” Markets were not only
centers of commerce, but they were often the place in which royal proclamations were typically posted.
See Chris R. Kyle, Monarch and Marketplace: Proclamations as News in Early Modern England, 78
HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 771 (2015). The proper analogy to sensitive places would be the Statute of
Northampton’s prohibition on coming armed before the King’s servants and courts.
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people’s peace.90 As one early justice of the peace manual published after the
adoption of the Second Amendment noted: “The term, peace, denotes that
condition of the body politic, in which no person suffers, or has just cause to fear
any injury . . . .”91 Understanding the absorption and development of the common
law, including the concept of the peace, is absolutely central to reconstructing the
legal framework for the regulation of firearms in the early American Republic.92
Furthermore, it is vital to recognize that this process of absorption and
Americanization was exceedingly complex. The common law did not evolve in a
uniform fashion across different jurisdictions. Each state adopted its own variant
of the common law, but despite the powerful forces of localism, clear regional
patterns also emerged in early American law. One of the most important
historical forces shaping this process of transformation was the institution of
slavery.93
The Heller Court focused primarily on a string of antebellum Southern cases
in evaluating the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections,94 and did not
account for the regional differences in Founding-era firearms legislation.95
Setting aside the moral issues of developing modern firearms jurisprudence on
models created by slave-owning judges, there is an additional problem with
Heller’s exclusive focus on Southern case law: Southern gun rights
exceptionalism. Heller erroneously concluded that this exceptional model of
permissive gun carrying was the norm and not the exception in American law
during the Founding era and early American Republic.96
Rather than supporting the libertarian understanding of expansive public
carry reflected in Heller, a model that was rooted in the anomalous conditions of
the Slave South, the dominant model in early America law emerged outside of
the South in Massachusetts. It adapted the traditional common law framework in
light of the American experience and Enlightenment-inspired legal reforms.97
Shortly after the adoption of the Second Amendment, Massachusetts enacted its
own version of the Statute of Northampton. Although the Massachusetts version

90. See generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (2009).
91. JOSEPH BACKUS, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 23 (Hartford, B. & J. Russell 1816).
92. On the transplantation of English models of peacekeeping to colonial America, see generally
Alfred L. Brophy, For the Preservation of the King’s Peace and Justice: Community and English Law in
Sussex County, Pennsylvania, 1682–1696, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 167 (1996).
93. See ELLEN H. PEARSON, REMAKING CUSTOM: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 9 (2011).
94. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585 n.9 (2008).
95. While the Court acknowledged that the history of regulation was vital to illuminating the scope
of the right, it did not undertake the necessary and laborious historical research to excavate that history.
See id. at 626 (“[W]e do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the
Second Amendment . . . .”).
96. See id.
97. On the tensions between traditional common law and Enlightenment efforts to rationalize and
systematize the law, see generally SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND:
CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE (2016).
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borrowed some phrases from common law, the Massachusetts legislature opted
to rewrite the law in terms more accessible to ordinary readers in the new
American republic. The new act as a whole emulated the glosses on this ancient
English law that had become common in popular legal guides. The language was
clear and forceful: it outlawed anyone who “shall ride or go armed offensively, to
the fear or terror of the good citizens of this Commonwealth.”98 The act
specifically distinguished riding armed offensively from the separate crimes of
affray, riot, or disturbing the peace. Armed travel was thus a per se violation of
the statute.
One of the most difficult problems modern courts face in applying Heller’s
historical framework is the unfamiliar nature of common law terminology and
legal concepts. Discomfort with this sometimes archaic language has even
prompted some courts to derisively suggest that texts written in the language of
Chaucer’s age can hardly matter to American law after independence.99
Although this language does sound unfamiliar to modern courts and legal
scholars, it was not strange to early American judges, justices of the peace, and
legislators. Courts honoring Heller must look to those historical sources to
understand how legal texts, including the Second Amendment and its state level
analogs, would have been interpreted.
The Massachusetts version’s use of the phrases “armed offensively” and “fear
or terror of the good citizens”—borrowed from the Statute of Northampton—
tracked closely the traditional common law usage of these terms.100 In modern
America, guns are often described as defensive weapons, but this was not true
under English common law. Guns were always offensive weapons; defensive
weapons were a separate category that included shields and armor.101 Similarly,
modern law rests on notions of mens rea that were alien to the common law.
There was no requirement to discern the specific psychological state or the
subjective intent of an individual carrying a gun: the common law model inferred
the requisite intent from the illegal action itself.102 Thus, reading the
Massachusetts prohibition on armed travel as allowing peaceful defensive carry
and only forbidding aggressive armed carry—the preferred reading of
libertarians—is not only contrary to the text, it effectively effaces the entire
98. 1795 Mass. Acts 436.
99. For a good example of this problematic reading of the history in recent federal cases, see supra
note 71.
100. Statutory construction in this era was steeped in common law modes of legal analysis. For a
useful summary, see ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, 1 A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
11 (1822).
101. Under English law, firearms were always treated as offensive weapons, but the law also
acknowledged that even ordinary objects could in some circumstances be used as offensive weapons. See
HAWKINS, supra note 50, at 227.
102. Under common law, the requisite criminal intent “was presumed from the performance of the
unlawful act.” BINDER, supra note 63, at 141. For additional analysis of this history, particularly as it
relates to Blackstone, see generally Simon Stern, Blackstone’s Criminal Law: Common-Law
Harmonization and Legislative Reform, in FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 61
(Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014).
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concept of the peace and the role that justices of the peace and constables played
in preserving the peace. In reality, the libertarian claim that surety of the peace
laws effectively allowed individuals to carry arms, unless a specific individual
came forward to demand a peace bond, turns Founding-era history on its head.
The purpose of these laws was to achieve the opposite goal: limit armed travel in
public to a narrow range of exceptions.103
Most states recognized that the common law, as adapted by American courts
prior to the Revolution, was part of American law.104 One of the most dramatic
statements of this principle occurred in the Massachusetts case Commonwealth
v. Leach.105 Rather than dismiss English history as irrelevant, the court expressly
affirmed that the statutes creating the office of the justice of the peace dating
from the reign of Edward III, and bestowing extensive powers on that office, had
been absorbed into the common law of the Commonwealth.106 This view was
echoed in the influential legal guidebook The Massachusetts Justice: “The statues
of Edward III, respecting the jurisdiction and powers of the justice of the peace,
have been adopted and practiced upon here, and are considered to be as part of
our common law.”107 Making sense of the role of the peace therefore requires
understanding the broad powers justices of the peace and constables had to
enforce the peace, including powers to preemptively disarm individuals and
impose a variety of peace bonds.108 Rather than dismiss the Statute of
Northampton and its legal progeny as shrouded in the cobwebs of history, or as
antiquated legal principles appropriate to “Chaucer’s fourteenth century
England”109 but not early America, it is important to understand that American
legislators and judges were steeped in legal culture that was shaped by common
law concepts and modes of reasoning.
Acknowledging the importance of America’s common law inheritance does
not mean that law remained frozen in time. The decades after the American
Revolution up until the period of Jacksonian democracy were marked by
profound legal change. In particular, this was a period when legal commentators
and legislatures contemplated ways of codifying and updating many aspects of

103. For examples of libertarian scholarship erroneously asserting a right of peaceful armed travel,
see supra note 4 and accompanying text. For courts that have accepted this erroneous account, see supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
104. On the absorption of the common law into colonial America, see generally WILLIAM NELSON,
1–4 THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA (2008–2018); KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW,
HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM
(2011).
105. 1 Mass. 59 (1804).
106. See id. at 60–61.
107. JOHN C. B. DAVIS, THE MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE 1 (Worcester, W. Lazell 1847).
108. Id.
109. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th
Cir. 2019).
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American law, including the individual states’ criminal codes.110 Although
comprehensive efforts to systematize American law fell far short of a complete
overhaul, efforts to streamline and update various areas of the law, including
criminal law, were successful in many states, including in Massachusetts.111
Massachusetts’s revised law prohibiting public carry that was implemented
during this period introduced a key change that departed from the common law:
it recognized a good cause exception to the traditional common law ban on armed
travel. Under common law, there was no right to arm oneself preemptively, even
in situations where one faced an imminent threat.112 The common law required
one to seek out a justice of the peace and bind over the threatening individual to
a surety. Moreover, it assumed that the community-based law enforcement
model that empowered local justices of the peace would be able to preempt
threats by simply disarming a potentially dangerous person.113 The new
Massachusetts Model recognized that this might not be sufficient to protect
individuals in all circumstances and added another option: if one had a
reasonable fear of imminent harm, one might now arm oneself.114 The
development of this reasonable threat exception for armed self-defense reflected
the impact of Enlightenment ideals on legal reform. This change also reflected
the norms and ideals of the more individualistic, democratic, and marketoriented world of Jacksonian America.115 By including a good cause exception,
Massachusetts broke with traditional common law and in so doing expanded both
the concept of gun rights and the scope of legal self-defense. It also pointed the
way toward the development of “stand your ground” laws.
The new, more expansive, conception of gun rights and self-defense that
emerged in Massachusetts still fell well short of the more aggressive “stand your
ground” conception that would emerge later in the nineteenth century.116 Nor
was the new model a complete repudiation of the common law’s efforts to limit
the ability of individuals to use deadly force. Absent a reasonable fear, one still
had a duty to retreat or seek help if it was available.117 The new law also did not
110. For a recent assessment of the appeal and ultimate failure of American codification, see Gunther
A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 498–
527 (2000).
111. For Massachusetts-style laws, see 1852 Del. Laws 733; MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 162, § 16, reprinted
in THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 690, 692 (1846); 1847 Va. Acts 127, 129.
112. See 1836 Mass. Acts 529–30, 750. The revised Massachusetts criminal code gave individuals a
right to approach a justice of a peace for sureties and carried forward the authority of peace officers to
bind over individuals who traveled armed in violation of the statute.
113. See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
114. See Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths
from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1719–20 (2012).
115. On gun culture in Jacksonian America, see CORNELL, supra note 19, at 137–67. On the general
impact of the Market Revolution on American law, see KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 67–129 (1989).
116. On the origins of the stand your ground principle in American law, see generally RICHARD. M.
BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY
(1994).
117. See 1836 Mass. Acts 529–30, 750.
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diminish the considerable powers of justices of the peace, who continued to be
the primary enforcers of the peace, and who retained the power to bind
individuals with sureties if they posed a potential threat to public safety.118
Further, some aspects of earlier community-based policing remained available to
members of the community: anyone who felt threatened by an individual could
seek out a justice of the peace to impose sureties.119 In this sense, the new
Massachusetts Model reformed and modernized, but did not entirely efface every
feature of, the older common law tradition. Given these facts, it is difficult to
credit the anachronistic interpretation proffered by modern libertarians who
have argued such American surety laws functioned as a de facto license to carry,
allowing anyone to travel armed as long as they did so peacefully.120 Although a
variant of this interpretation emerged in some antebellum Southern
jurisdictions—places where a more libertarian model of public carry gained
judicial notice—it was not how the Massachusetts Model was understood by
leading legal commentators at the time.121
The best exposition of the legal import of the revised Massachusetts law
occurred in a grand jury charge delivered by the distinguished Massachusetts
jurist Peter Oxenbridge Thacher: “In our own Commonwealth [of
Massachusetts], no person may go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or
other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend
an assault or violence to his person, family, or property.”122 Rather than
countenance such practices, Thacher reminded members of the grand jury that
the law, not individuals arming themselves, was the appropriate means to
preserve ordered liberty in a republic.123 His summary of the scope of the
Massachusetts regulatory scheme was deemed sufficiently important to merit
publication, a fact that highlights its significance. Indeed, a short section laying
out the limits on armed travel was excerpted from the larger grand jury charge
and reprinted in the press as a separate article.124
Thacher was a revered figure in the Massachusetts bar and a leading authority
on interpreting the state’s criminal law.125 The publication of a book containing a

118. See id.
119. On early history of peace bonds and good behavior bonds and the persistence of this tradition
in early America, see generally EDWARDS, supra note 90.
120. See, e.g., FIREARMS LAW, supra note 4.
121. Libertarian scholars and the Young majority read antebellum law through the lens of State v.
Huntly, a case that reflected the views of pro-slavery Southern judges, and was not the legal norm outside
of some parts of the Slave South. Compare Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1066 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing
State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418 (1843)), with Ruben & Cornell, supra note 7.
122. PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF
SUFFOLK FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF THE TERMS OF THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1836, AND ON
MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A.D. 1837, at 27 (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1837).
123. See id. at 27–31.
124. Judge Thacher’s Charges, CHRISTIAN REG. & BOS. OBSERVER, June 10, 1837, at 91.
125. Libertarian scholars have recognized the serious problem Thacher poses and have attempted to
diminish his importance by minimizing and tarnishing Thacher’s reputation. Thus, the libertarian authors
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selection of his grand jury charges and trials was lauded by members of the legal
community as a noteworthy occasion in American criminal jurisprudence.126 The
American Review, an influential Whig magazine, singled out this volume with
effusive praise, commenting that the judge’s “high character as a magistrate was
not only known to the profession in New England, but his published charges to
grand juries, and occasional reports of important cases tried before him, had
made him known throughout the country.”127 Thacher’s interpretation of his own
state’s law on firearms was unambiguous: there was no right of peaceful armed
travel absent a reasonable threat.128
Nor was Thacher’s grand jury charge the only example of a contemporary
commentary that discussed the limits on armed travel in Massachusetts. “Have
not our legislature forbidden, and ought not every legislature,” another
newspaper essayist wrote, traveling “armed with pistols, swords, daggers, bowieknives or other offensive and dangerous weapons.”129 Legislation in this area was
a proper and natural exercise of the state’s robust police power. Indeed, any
argument to the contrary was both “unfounded and alarming.”130
The Massachusetts Model of good cause requirements for armed travel was
not an outlier among American jurisdictions, but it was widely emulated and
became the dominant approach to public carry prior to the Civil War.131 During
the Reconstruction era, Massachusetts’s influence expanded further and even
gained traction in the South, effectively supplanting the more libertarian model
that slave-owning judges had championed in the decades before the Civil War.
The centrality of the Massachusetts Model during Reconstruction was evident in
a decision rendered by the Republican-controlled Texas Supreme Court in
English v. State.132 The Court confidently affirmed that Massachusetts-style laws
were “not peculiar to our own State.”133 Indeed, it concluded that “it [was] safe

of Firearms Law falsely claim that grand jury charges in the early Republic were mere symbolic occasions
with little legal significance and therefore Thacher’s views are not probative. See FIREARMS LAW, supra
note 4, at 79–80. In fact, the opposite was the case. Grand jury charges were formal legal occasions, and
were an integral part of the jury system, and important civic occasions in which leading judges educated
the public about the meaning of the law. For relevant studies on the culture of grand jury charges, see
DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 93–98 (2016); Joshua Glick, On the
Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1754 (2003).
126. REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CASES, TRIED IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON,
BEFORE PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, JUDGE OF THAT COURT FROM 1823 TO 1843, at v (Horatio
Woodman ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1845).
127. See 3 THE AMERICAN REVIEW: A WHIG JOURNAL OF POLITICS, LITERATURE, ART, AND
SCIENCE 222–23 (George H. Colton ed., N.Y., Wiley & Putnam 1846).
128. See THACHER, supra note 122.
129. An Address, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1838.
130. Id.
131. For examples of laws that borrowed language from the Massachusetts Model and limited public
carry to situations where an individual had a good cause to fear imminent attack, see, for example, 1857
D.C. Rev. Code 570; 1852 Del. Laws 333; 1840 Me. Stat. 709; MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 162, § 16, reprinted
in THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 690, 692 (1846); 1847 Va. Acts 127.
132. 35 Tex. 473 (1871).
133. Id. at 479.
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to say that almost, if not every one of the States of this union [had] a similar law
upon their statute books, and, indeed, so far as we [had] been able to examine
them, they [were] more rigorous than the act under consideration.”134 Even after
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court reasoned that good cause,
Massachusetts-style, laws were entirely consistent with protections for the right
to bear arms.135 In the view of the Texas Supreme Court, the Massachusetts good
cause model—not the Southern libertarian interpretation relied on in Heller—
had become the prevailing view in American law.
The same conclusion was reached by the editors of the influential legal
reference work, The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, a popular and
comprehensive multi-volume legal text published at the end of the nineteenth
century.136 The Encyclopedia’s entry on the laws covering carrying firearms in
public adopted the same interpretation as the highest court of Texas. The editors
confidently asserted that:
The statutes of some of the States have made it an offence to carry weapons concealed
about the body, while others prohibit the simple carrying of weapons, whether they are
concealed or not. Such statutes have been held not to conflict with the constitutional
right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms.137

IV
CONCLUSION
The turn to text, history, and tradition as a means of adjudicating Second
Amendment claims asks much of judges. First, courts must decide between two
opposing narratives about Anglo-American legal history.138 Gun-rights advocates
have advanced a libertarian narrative that mischaracterizes English common law
and treats American law as if Southern gun-rights exceptionalism were a national
norm and not a regional anomaly. Alternatively, courts have been presented with
a new historical consensus supported by both English and American legal
historians. According to this view, there was no right to public carry at common

134. Id.
135. For a discussion of this case in the context of Reconstruction, see Mark Anthony Frassetto, The
Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 95, 113–17 (2016).
136. See 3 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 411–13 (Northport, E.
Thompson 1887).
137. Id. at 408. For a review praising this compendium as an indispensable guide for practicing
lawyers and scholars alike, see Review: American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 42 CENT. L.J. 400
(1896). This had been the view of the influential jurist John Forrest Dillon in his review of firearms law
as well. See John Forrest Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private Defense, 1
CENT. L.J. 259 (1874) (arguing that state police power allowed restrictions on public carry as long as an
express or implied exception existed for cases where there was a reason to fear imminent harm).
138. A third civic paradigm in which public carry was limited to militia-related activity emerged in
some parts of the South. However, some have argued that this paradigm, even broadly construed, appears
to be precluded by Heller. See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 463 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting)
(“Heller, however, expressly rejects the argument that the Second Amendment protects a purely civic
right.” (internal citation omitted)); Michael O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry
Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585,
609–10 (2012).
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law. Moreover, this model acknowledges the role of diversity and change in
American legal history. The existence of a common law inheritance did not mean
that different jurisdictions evolved in lockstep. Rather, the common law
fragmented and fostered the emergence of distinctive regional gun cultures and
regulatory schemes. A permissive Southern model and a more limited good cause
model developed by the era of the Civil War. By the end of the nineteenth
century, the good cause model had triumphed over the permissive Southern
model. The Massachusetts Model expanded gun rights beyond the narrow
protections afforded under English common law, but this expansion was
tempered by a continuing recognition of the need to protect the peace. The
balance it struck between liberty and order was one that most Americans would
have recognized as familiar and is one that courts ought to honor in future Second
Amendment jurisprudence.
At a minimum, federal courts evaluating text, history, an tradition in future
gun cases will need to heed Justice Scalia’s admonition regarding the dangers of
confirmation bias and the selective use of evidence, a practice where judges and
advocates treat history as an exercise in “look[ing] over the heads of the crowd
and pick[ing] out your friends.”139 In evaluating history, courts will need to accept
that American law did not speak with a single voice on the scope of the right to
travel armed in public. Claims that there was a broad right to public carry at
English common law and that the South’s permissive open-carry regime enjoyed
hegemonic sway in early America—the claims at the root of the libertarian
account of the history of gun regulation—are demonstrably false. If history is to
have a role to play in the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence, it is
important to get the history right.

139. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 36 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).

